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DIVIDED WE FALL:  THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION’S PROPOSAL FOR INDEPENDENT 
MEMBER STATES TO REGULATE THE CULTIVATION OF 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS 
LAURA MOORE SMITH* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The European Union (EU) has the second largest amount of 
arable land in the world, but grows less than 1% of the world‘s 
genetically modified crops.1  Believing this discrepancy in the ratio 
of arable land to genetically modified organisms (GMOs) violated 
a number of trade agreements, the United States, Argentina, and 
Canada requested that the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
review the EU‘s approval, application, and regulation of GMOs.2  
In 2006, the WTO found that the EU had essentially suspended the 
approval of GMOs, resulting in a de facto moratorium on biotech 
products with a significant impact on the world market.3  The 
WTO agreed with the United States and other parties that the de 
facto moratorium was an ―across-the-board marketing ban‖ of 
GMOs and violated the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
 
* J.D. candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2012; B.A., The Col-
lege of Wooster, 2006.  I would like to thank Professor Howard F. Chang for his 
time and expertise.  All errors and omissions are my own. 
1 Debra M. Strauss, Feast or Famine: The Impact of the WTO Decision Favoring 
the U.S. Biotechnology Industry in the EU Ban of Genetically Modified Foods , 45 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 775, 778 (2008). 
2 See Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 
29, 2006) at 2–3 (describing the establishment a WTO panel to review the Europe-
an Community‘s approval method for biotech products and certain prohib itions 
that member States impose on the marketing of biotech products). 
3 See id. at 41 (―In terms of form, the moratorium consists of concerted acts and 
omissions of the European Communities and its member States to stall  decision-
making with respect to biotech product applications at key stages of the approval 
process.‖). 
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and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).4  In a 2010 response 
to the WTO, the EU proposed to Member States that each nation 
may decide whether or not to cultivate GMOs within their borders. 
While this proposal to decentralize GMO cultivation decision-
making may better protect against risks associated with scientific 
uncertainty, decentralization is unsuitable for the EU‘s common 
marketplace due to the potential harm of GMO contamination and 
high transaction costs.  Instead, the EU should form a Community-
wide decision-making body to determine the effects of GMOs and 
approve appropriate biotechnologies through a precautionary 
principle lens. 
This Comment will explore the issues surrounding the control 
of GMOs in the EU and why a centralized regulatory system is the 
best approach given the unique relationship between EU Member 
States.  Section 2 will discuss the history of the WTO‘s 2006 
decision and the EU‘s 2010 proposal.  Section 3 will discuss the 
benefits of a centralized decision-making process regarding GMO 
cultivation.  Section 4 will evaluate the EU‘s decentralized 
approach and describe the inefficiencies of the proposal given the 
distinctive nature of the EU‘s Common Market. 
2. GMOS IN THE WORLD MARKET 
On July 13, 2010, the EU proposed a regulation of the European 
Parliament and Council to allow Member States to decide whether 
to cultivate GMOs within their borders.5  Under the proposal, the 
 
4 See id. at 41–44 (explaining how the moratorium violates the various provi-
sions of the SPS Agreement).  
5 See, e.g., Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2001/18/EC as Regards the Possibility for the Member States to Re-
strict or Prohibit the Cultivation of GMOs in Their Territory, at 2, COM (2010) 375 fi-
nal (July 13, 2010) [hereinafter EU 2010 Proposal] (explaining that ―[t]he European 
Union authorisation system is aimed at avoiding adverse effects of GMOs on hu-
man and animal health and the environment while establishing an internal mar-
ket for those products‖).  By 2003, six member states had invoked ―safeguard pro-
visions‖ under EC Directive 90/220 (France, Germany, Austria, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and Greece), five member states banned the marketing of GMOs 
(Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg), and one member state 
banned the import of GMOs (Greece).  Panel Report, supra note 2, at 31.  Further-
more, Austria prohibited the marketing of three specific biotech maizes (Bt-176, 
MON810, and T25), France prohibited two rapeseed products (MS1/RF1 and 
Topas 19/2), Luxembourg and Germany prohibited one type of maize (Bt-176), 
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EU retains the right to decide what GMO seeds may be placed on 
the market, and Member States cannot interrupt the free circulation 
of products containing GMOs, GMO seeds, or related planting 
materials.6  Member States also may not affect the cultivation of 
plants that have an adventitious presence or ―technically 
unavoidable traces‖ of any GMO approved by the EU.7  The 
European Parliament adopted the proposal at its first reading on 
July 5, 2011.8 
2.1. GMOs and the 2006 World Trade Organization Panel Report 
The EU‘s proposal was in response to a 2006 panel report by 
the WTO that the EU‘s approach to GMOs violated the SPS 
Agreement.9  Under the SPS Agreement, states cannot arbitrarily or 
unjustifiably discriminate against another member‘s products 
when ―identical or similar conditions prevail.‖10  Nations are 
allowed to take appropriate, discriminatory actions against 
products ―if there is a scientific justification.‖11  Scientific 
justification is established through a risk assessment on the impact 
to ―human, animal, or plant life or health . . . .‖12  Nations must 
take into account risk assessment techniques such as processes and 
 
Italy prohibited four types of maize (Bt-11, MON810, MON 809 and T25), and 
Greece prohibited the importation of Topas 19/2, an oilseed rape.  Id.  
6 See EU 2010 Proposal, supra note 5, at 12 (explaining that the relevant Direc-
tives pertain only to the cultivation of GMOs, but not to their free circulation).  
7 Id. 
8 Procedure File, Genetically Modified Organisms GMOs: Possibility for the Mem-
ber States to Restrict or Prohibit the Cultivation of GMOs in Their Territory (amend. Di-
rective 2001/18/EC) (July 5, 2011), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu 
/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2011-0314. 
9 See Panel Report, supra note 2, at 681 (describing the Panel‘s evidence for its 
conclusion that the Group of Five Countries and Commission had effected a mor-
atorium without having adopted an EC rule or decision-making process). 
10 See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
art. 2(3), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 494 [hereinafter SPS Agreement] (providing 
that members are to ―ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures do 
not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Member[] [States] where 
identical or similar conditions prevail‖). 
11 Id. art. 3(3). 
12 See id. art. 5(1) (describing what assessments sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures should be based upon). 
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production methods, sampling and testing, and the prevalence of 
disease.13 
In May 2003, the United States, Argentina, and Canada 
requested consultation with the EU regarding its policies on 
biotechnology, claiming that the EU had placed a moratorium on 
approving GMOs since October 1998 in violation of their trade 
treaties.14  After failing to come to an agreement, the United States 
requested that the WTO establish a panel to review the dispute.15  
The WTO found that the EU directives on GMOs fell clearly within 
the authority of the SPS Agreement and that the EU had effectively 
enacted a moratorium on GMOs between June 1999 and August 
2003,16 in violation of the first clause of Annex C(1)(b) and Article 8 
of the SPS Agreement.17  The Panel found that five countries—
 
13 Id. art. 5(2). 
14 See Panel Report, supra note 2, at 1 (introducing the procedural history of 
the three states‘ complaints).  Before 1998, the EC had approved over ten biotech 
products, after which the EU suspended their approval process and no new bio-
tech products had been approved since October 1998.  Id. at 27–28.  Although the 
EU never formally adopted a ban on GMOs, EU officials have acknowledged the 
moratorium.  Id. at 19–20.  The EU went on to note in its First Written Submission 
that it wished to: 
underline from the very beginning that it has not adopted any 
general position either in favour or against any of the products 
subject to these proceedings.  In accordance with its regulatory 
framework, the European Communities assesses each individu-
al GMO on its own merits, in order to evaluate the potential 
benefits and risks of these novel products. 
Id. at 64. 
15 See id. at 3 (noting further that the dispute was over ―(1) the operation and 
application by the European Communities of its regime for approval of biotech 
products; and (2) certain measures adopted and maintained by EC members 
States prohibiting or restricting the marketing of biotech products‖). 
16 See id. at 612–13 (discussing a panel finding that a moratorium on GMO 
approvals was established within the relevant time frame). 
17 See id. at 682 (stating further that it was not necessary to determine whether 
or not the EU violated Article XI:1 of the GATT).  Article C(1)(a) reads: ―Members 
shall ensure, with respect to any procedure to check and ensure the fulfilment of 
sanitary or phytosanitary measures, that: such procedures are undertaken and 
completed without undue delay and in no less favourable manner for imported 
products than for like domestic products.‖  See SPS Agreement, supra note 10, An-
nex C(1)(a).  Article 8 of the SPS Agreement notes:  
Members shall observe the provisions of Annex C in the opera-
tion of control, inspection and approval procedures, including 
national systems for approving the use of additives or for estab-
lishing tolerances for contaminants in foods, beverages or 
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Denmark, Italy, France, Greece, and Luxembourg—declared in 
1999 that they would ―do what was within their power‖ to ensure 
that no GMOs were approved until the European Commission had 
established guidelines on the labeling and traceability of 
biotechnology.18  The WTO accepted the EU‘s argument that the 
Commission believed that it could not approve GMOs without the 
support of these five countries,19 and noted that no GMOs were 
approved on the Member State level between 1999 and 2003.20  
Regardless of the Five Countries‘ actions, however, the WTO noted 
that the European Commission was not bound by the Member 
States‘ position on GMOs and did not ―make full use of the 
relevant procedures to complete the approval process.‖21 
The EU‘s approval process is outlined in a 2001 Directive on 
the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified 
organisms.  Under the Directive, the decision whether to place a 
GMO on the market begins with a Member State receiving 
notification from an applicant.22  If the GMO is to be placed on the 
market for the first time, a ―competent authority‖ of the Member 
State receiving the application must prepare a report.23  After 
forwarding the notification to other Member States, the lead 
Member State reviews the notification, which includes 
 
feedstuffs, and otherwise ensure that their procedures are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement.  
Id. art. 8. 
18 See Panel Report, supra note 2, at 612 (explaining a panel finding that 
showed a deliberate intent on the part of the Group of Five countries to prevent 
approval of GMO applications). 
19 See id. (noting that because of a declaration by the Group of Five countries, 
the Commission did not think it could approve applications without the support 
of member states). 
20 See id. at 613 (noting that often one of the five member states cited the 1999 
Declaration as a reason for disapproving GMO applications). 
21 See id. at 613–14 (delineating reasons for the Panel‘s inference of the Com-
mission's conduct). 
22 See Directive 2001/18, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
March 2001 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modi-
fied Organisms and Repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC, art. 13(1), 2001 O.J. 
(L 106) (stating that ―a notification shall be submitted to the competent authority 
of the Member State where such a GMO is to be placed on the market for the first 
time‖). 
23 See id. art. 15 (explaining that the competent authority ―shall give consent 
in writing for placing on the market‖). 
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environmental risk assessments, conditions for placing the 
bioproduct on the market, a plan for monitoring, and a plan for 
labeling and packaging the product.24  The Member State then 
prepares an assessment report within ninety days of receiving the 
notification, indicating whether the GMO should be placed on the 
market.25 
No GMOs, furthermore, could be placed on the market unless 
it was authorized under Regulation 1829/2003.26  In accordance 
with this regulation, Member States send GMO applications to the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) for scientific assessments 
of the potential health and environmental risks.27  The Member 
State also performs an environmental risk assessment if the 
application includes a request to cultivate the GMO.  After all of 
the information and opinions are published on the EFSA website 
and circulated among Member States, the European Commission 
solicits public opinion and decides whether to approve the 
application.28  Despite these clear regulations and approval 
procedures, however, the WTO found that the EU had not actually 
approved any GMO products between 1999 and 2003, and had 
only conducted risk assessments on fourteen of the twenty-seven 
pending applications for biotech products.29 
During the WTO‘s review, the United States maintained that, 
according to the scientific committees, there was no ―rational 
 
24 Id. art. 13. 
25 Id. art. 14. 
26 See Commission Regulation 1829/2003, of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 22 Sept. 2003 on Genetically Modified Food and Feed, 2003 O.J. (L 
268) 1, 2 (stating that genetically modified food and feed should only be placed in 
the market after scientific evaluation by the European Food Safety Authority).  
27 See European Food Safety Authority, EFSA‘s Role in the GMO Regulatory 
Framework, available at http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/gmotopics 
/docs/gmoauthorisation.pdf (outlining the procedure under which GMO appli-
cations are assessed). 
28 See id. (detailing the process for GMO application approval).  
29 Panel Report, supra note 2, at 37.  The risk assessments examined ―(1) the 
likelihood of the establishment or spread of a pest, and (2) the potential for ad-
verse effects on human or animal health arising from the presence of toxins or 
disease-causing organisms in food or feedstuffs.‖  See also id. at 39 (―As the nature 
of the risks associated with biotech products varies considerably from plant varie-
ty to variety, general assertions about the risks of biotech products, as a class, 
cannot be made.  Each biotech product needs to be evaluated on a case-by-base 
basis, taking into consideration the factors outlined above.‖). 
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relationship‖ between the EU‘s moratorium and the risk 
assessments for the unapproved biotech products.30  In response, 
the EU contended that the ―complaining parties seek to evade or 
ignore the whole socio-political, legal, factual, and scientific 
complexity of the case‖ and that the GMOs in question had 
characteristics that may pose potential threat to human and 
environmental health.31  GMOs, the EU insisted, are not the 
equivalent to their non-biotech counterparts.32  Nevertheless, the 
WTO decided that the EU ―acted inconsistently with its obligations 
under‖ the SPS Agreement.33 
Two years after the WTO‘s decision, the Council of the 
European Union issued a series of guidelines on GMOs.34  Noting 
the necessity to improve the implementation of a GMO framework 
and ―the necessity of continuing processing applications without 
undue delays,‖35 the Council called for EFSA and Member States to 
develop a framework for the authorization of GMOs that took into 
consideration environmental assessment and monitoring 
arrangements, socio-economic benefits and risks, the expertise of 
the scientific community, a labeling system for GMO seeds, and the 
possibility for protected areas.36  Specifically, the Council noted 
that EFSA should develop and update transparent guidelines to 
 
30 See id. at 37 (arguing that product-specific moratoria are inconsistent with 
the SPS agreement because they are not based on the European Communities‘ risk 
assessments).  
31 Id. at 64–65 (detailing the European Communities‘ responses to complaints 
filed against them). 
32 See id. at 65–66 (arguing, overall, that the EU did not delay in reviewing 
applications and was not in violation of the SPS Agreement). 
33 See id. at 682; see also SPS Agreement, supra note 10, at annex C(1)(a) 
(providing the requirements of Annex C(1)(b) of the SPS Agreement, which are to 
check and ensure sanitary and phytosanitary measures). 
34 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Genetically Modi-
fied Organisms 2 (Dec. 5, 2008), available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu 
/pdf/en/08/st16/st16882.en08.pdf (―It is therefore necessary to look for im-
provement of the implementation of this legal framework [for the authorization of 
GMOs] in order to better meet the objectives of the EC legislation, taking into co n-
sideration the necessity of continuing processing applications without undue de-
lays and respecting the relevant EC international obligations.‖). 
35 Id. 
36 See id. at 2–8 (explaining in greater detail the way countries can better use 
expertise, create labeling systems, and monitor arrangements).  
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assess the environmental risks of GMOs.37  Additionally, while the 
Council did not mandate that Member States independently 
regulate the cultivation of GMOs within their borders, they did 
suggest the possibility.38 
2.2. The EU’s Response 
On July 5, 2011, the European Parliament adopted at its first 
reading the proposal amending the 2001 Directive.39  In the 
amended Directive, ―in accordance with Article 2(2)‖ [of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union] Member States should 
―be entitled to have a possibility to adopt binding legislative 
provisions concerning the cultivation of GMOs in their territory 
after the GMO has been legally authorised to be placed on the EU 
market.‖40  Member States are authorized to adopt case-by-case 
restrictions or prohibitions regarding the cultivation of particular 
GMOs or groups of GMOs.41  While restrictions or prohibitions 
 
37 See id. at 3 (noting the Commission‘s mandate ―to the EFSA to further de-
velop and update its guidelines as regards the environmental risk assessments of 
GMOs‖).  
38 See id. (inviting member states to regulate the cultivation of GMOs).  
39 See Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Amending Directive 2001/18/EC as Regards the Possibility for the Member 
States to Restrict or Prohibit the Cultivation of GMOs in Their Territory, Comm. on the 
Env‘t, Pub. Health & Food Safety, at 5–6 (April 20, 2011), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7
-2011-0170&language=EN&mode=XML#_part1_def2 [hereinafter 2011 Amended 
Proposal] (describing Directive 2001/18/EC as only allowing GMOs to be placed 
on the market after specific environmental risk assessment is carried out). 
40 Id. amend. 5.  Article 2(2) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European 
Union provides:  
When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the 
Member States in a specific area, the Union and the Member States may 
legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area.  The Member States 
shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exer-
cised its competence.  The Member States shall again exercise their com-
petence to the extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its 
competence.   
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 
2(2), March 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
41 See 2011 Amended Proposal, supra note 39, amend. 15 (proposing Amend-
ment 16 to Directive 18/EC/2001 for measures to be based on grounds other than 
those related to the assessment of the adverse effect on health and the enviro n-
ment). 
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may be based on ―scientifically justified grounds relating to 
environmental impacts which might arise from the deliberate 
release or the placing on the market of GMOs,‖42 the amended text 
enumerates a variety of reasons to exclude GMOs: 
[T]he prevention of the development of pesticide resistance 
amongst weeds and pests; the invasiveness or persistence 
of a GM variety, or the possibility of interbreeding with 
domestic cultivated or wild plants; the prevention of 
negative impacts on the local environment caused by 
changes in agricultural practices linked to the cultivation of 
GMOs; the maintenance and development of agricultural 
practices which offer a better potential to reconcile 
production with ecosystem sustainability; the maintenance 
of local biodiversity, including certain habitats and 
ecosystems, or certain types of natural and landscape 
features; the absence of adequate data or the existence of 
contradictory data or persisting scientific uncertainty 
concerning the potential negative impacts of the release of 
GMOs on the environment of a Member State or region, 
including on biodiversity. . . . [T]he impracticability or the 
high costs of coexistence measures or the impossibility of 
implementing coexistence measures due to specific 
geographical conditions such as small islands or mountain 
zones; the need to protect the diversity of agricultural 
production; the need to ensure seed purity; other grounds 
that may include land use, town and country planning, or other 
legitimate factors.43 
All Member States‘ measures, however, are limited to only the 
cultivation of GMOs, not to ―the free circulation and import of 
genetically modified seeds and plant propagating material, as or in 
products, and of the products of their harvest.‖44  No Member State 
may prevent or restrict the cultivation of authorized GMOs in 
other Member States as long as those Member States take ―effective 
measures‖ to prevent cross-border contamination.45   
 
42 Id. amend. 16. 
43 Id. (emphasis added). 
44 Id. amend. 7. 
45 Id. amend. 9. 
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Notably, the amended 2011 Directive cites authority under 
Article 192(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, instead of Article 114 as cited by the 2001 Directive.46  
Article 114 allows the European Parliament and the Council to 
enact legislation regarding the establishment and function of the 
Common Market,47 while Article 192 allows the European 
Parliament and Council to take action to preserve, protect, and 
improve the environment and protect human health.48  Reframing 
the Parliament‘s authority to regulate GMOs under an 
environmental lens and away from the economics of a Common 
Market allows Member States to potentially restrict or prohibit 
GMOs on ethical, social, and cultural grounds.49 
3. THE CASE FOR CENTRALIZED DECISION-MAKING REGARDING 
GMO CULTIVATION 
The importance of food safety and the high spillover effects of 
GMO contamination limit the effectiveness of prohibitions 
promulgated by Member States.  Centralized GMO regulation, on 
the other hand, could deal with spillover effects while still 
addressing location-specific concerns.  Unlike environmental 
regulation in the United States, centralized environmental 
regulation in the EU considers both environmental concerns and 
incentivizing the free movement of goods in the Common 
Market.50  As a result, centralized environmental policies better 
 
46 Id. amend. 1. 
47 See TFEU, supra note 40, art. 114 (stating that the European Parliament and 
Council shall ―adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as 
their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market‖).  
48 See id. art. 191, 192(1) (explaining that the policy of the European Parlia-
ment should have several human health and environmental protection objectives). 
49 See EU Member States to be Allowed to Ban GM Crops, GMO SAFETY (July 6, 
2011), http://www.gmo-safety.eu/news/1333.genetic-engineering-eu-parliament 
-national-cultivation-ban.html (highlighting that ―‘scientific uncertainty‘ and so-
cio-economic grounds‖ may serve as legitimate reasons for a national ban under 
the amended proposal). 
50 See Roger Van Den Bergh, Economic Criteria for Applying the Subsidiarity 
Principle in European Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY 
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 80, 83 (Richard L. Revesz et al. eds., 2000) (arguing 
that centralized environmental regulation in the United States arose well after 
states were economically and politically integrated). 
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account for efficiency in the marketplace while still taking into 
account the specific circumstances of Member States.51 
Under the Treaty of the European Economic Community, 
furthermore: 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, 
the Community shall take action, in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives 
of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or 
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the 
Community.52 
In compliance with this principle of subsidiarity, environmental 
directives have used four reasons for justifying Communitywide 
actions:  the demands of ―transboundary environmental 
pollution,‖ the ―need to create equal conditions‖ in the common 
market, the regulation of the ―free movement of goods,‖ and the 
―protection of ‗European environmental and cultural heritage‘ and 
human health.‖53  When addressing GMOs, centralization is 
appropriate because individual Member States cannot sufficiently 
address neither GMO transboundary pollution,54 the need to create 
equal conditions for GMO and non-GMO goods,55 the demands of 
regulating the free movement of GMO crops,56 nor the effective 
protection of health and the environment.57 
3.1. Spillover Effects 
Economist Wallace Oates‘s 1972 Decentralization Theorem 
states that without spillovers, a decentralized system of 
 
51 See id. (noting the importance of considering ―location-specific circum-
stances and regionally diversity‖ when establishing policies). 
52 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
art. 5, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 42 (emphasis added). 
53 Van Den Bergh, supra note 50, at 82 (citing EU Directives that exemplify 
each reason for centralization). 
54 See infra Section 3.1 (discussing spillover costs of GMO cultivation). 
55 See infra Section 4.2 (noting the impact of GMO cultivation on the EU 
Common Market). 
56 See infra Section 3.3 (evaluating the ideological objections to and transac-
tion costs associated with GMOs). 
57 See infra Section 4.1 (considering whether the EU proposal will prevent 
states from cultivating GMOs). 
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government should be preferred to a centralized one.58  Oates 
writes: 
It is generally desirable, as suggested by the condition of 
the perfect correspondence in the ideal model, to 
internalize, where possible, all the benefits and costs 
associated with the provision of a particular good.  In this 
way decisions concerning levels of consumption will be 
more likely to take into account the interests of all those 
whose welfare they influence.59 
GMOs, however, have a high spillover cost in transboundary 
contamination, making spillover costs one of the greatest issues 
surrounding GMO cultivation.  Unlike other WTO decisions 
regarding EU foodstuffs,60 GMOs have a unique impact on the 
environment in that they can spread their altered genetic material 
without human intervention through cross-pollination and 
contaminate non-GMO crops and products.  For example, although 
only two GMOs are grown in the EU,61 Greenpeace International‘s 
and GeneWatch UK‘s ―GM Contamination Register‖ noted 141 
instances of contamination by genetically modified organisms in 
Europe between 1997 and 2010.62  Such incidents include six 
 
58 See WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 35 (1972) (summarizing the ―De-
centralization Theorem‖). 
59 Id. at 46. 
60 See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, Risk Regulation, Endogenous Public Concerns, and 
the Hormones Dispute: Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself?, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 743, 745 
(2004) (noting the WTO‘s decision in favor of the United States regarding its disa-
greement with the EU over banning meat containing hormones).  The debate over 
animal hormones, however, is dissimilar to GMOs since livestock often provide 
high control over breeding, and hormones are not passed from generation to gen-
eration as altered genetic material. 
61 Press Release, Europa, Questions and Answers on the EU's New Approach 
to the Cultivation of GMOs (July 13, 2010), http://europa.eu/rapid 
/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/325&format=HTML&aged=0&la
nguage=EN&guiLanguage=en (observing that only one GM maize, MON 810, 
and one GM potato, the Amflora potato, are ―commercially cultivated in the EU,‖ 
while other GMO products, including ―one sugar beet, three soybean, three 
oilseed-rape, six cotton and seventeen maize products,‖ are authorized to be on 
the EU market to be used as animal feed and for other uses). 
62 GM Contamination Register, GENEWATCH UK & GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, 
http://www.gmcontaminationregister.org (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (providing 
search results for incidents of contamination in Europe).  The author‘s text accom-
panying notes 62–67 are based on 2010 data.  
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reports of unauthorized GM flax FP967 in Finland, traceable to 
shipments of seeds and products from other countries,63 and 
numerous reports of contaminated maize seeds in Austria,64 
France,65 Italy,66 and other European nations.67 
Once contaminated seeds are introduced into an area, either 
through mislabeled seeds or importing illegal GMOs, a GMO can 
spread through cross-pollination, seed saving and planting, 
planting equipment, and harvesting and storage practices.68  
Although the pollen of a single crop may not bound across nations 
in a single season, the impact of GMO crops on national borders 
and the dispersal of pollen over several generations cannot be 
disregarded.69  
 
63 See Finland—Continues to Find Unauthorised Linseed FP967 from Canada, 
GENEWATCH UK & GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, 
http://www.gmcontaminationregister.org/index.php?content=re_detail&gw_id
=301&reg=0&inc=0&con=0&cof=0&year=2010&handle2_page= (last visited Feb. 
14, 2012) (reporting that Finland informed the EU‘s Rapid Alert System for Food 
and Feed (RASFF) of the incidents). 
64 See Austria—Greenpeace Reveal Contamination of Maize Seed, 
GENEWATCH UK & GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, 
http://www.gmcontaminationregister.org/index.php?content=re_detail&gw_id
=46&reg=reg.1&inc=1&con=3&cof=0&year=0&handle2_page=0 (last visited Feb. 
14, 2012) (reporting that laboratory tests of Austrian maize revealed Monsanto 
and Novartis strains, both of which are genetically modified). 
65 See France—GM Contamination of Maize Seed Reported, GENEWATCH UK 
& GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, http://www.gmcontaminationregister.org/index 
.php?content=re_detail&gw_id=26&reg=reg.1&inc=1&con=3&cof=0&year=0&ha
ndle2_page=0 (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (reporting on findings of the French 
Government‘s Food Inspection Agency). 
66 See Italy—Over One-Hundred Farmers Discovered that the Seeds they had 
Bought and Planted were Contaminated by GM Maize, GENEWATCH UK & 
GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, http://www.gmcontaminationregister.org/index 
.php?content=re_detail&gw_id=36&reg=reg.1&inc=1&con=3&cof=0&year=0&ha
ndle2_page=1 (last visited Feb. 14, 2011) (reporting that farmers in Northern Italy 
―unknowingly planted 400 hectares with GM contaminated maize‖). 
67 See generally GM Contamination Register, supra note 62 (highlighting inci-
dents of contamination of seeds in Europe). 
68 See Alison Peck, The New Imperialism: Toward an Advocacy Strategy for GMO 
Accountability, 21 GEO. INT‘L ENVTL. L. REV. 37, 43 (2008) (discussing sources of GM 
contamination). 
69 See, e.g., FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, Farmers Briefing: Genetically Modified Crops 
and Animal Feed, http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/briefings/gm_crops 
_animal_feed.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2012) (noting predictions that maize cross-
pollination can occur over 500 meters, as well as cases of oilseed rape traveling 4 
kilometers despite barriers erected to contain the pollen). 
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Moreover, the threat of cross-pollination is not limited to seed 
mingling and contamination in cultivation.  In September 2011, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union held that honey produced 
from the pollen of genetically modified corn constituted ―food . . . 
containing ingredients produced from [genetically modified 
organisms] within the meaning of Article 3(1)(c) of Regulation No. 
1829/2003,‖ regardless of whether the genetically modified pollen 
was present intentionally or adventitiously.70  In the case, 
Monsanto‘s 810 maize was prohibited in Germany in 2009 by the 
German Federal Office for Consumer Protection and Food Safety.71  
The Free State of Bavaria, however, owned land cultivated for 
research purposes and grew Monsanto‘s 810 maize.72  In 2005, a 
neighboring beekeeper found trace amounts of MON 810 DNA in a 
number of honey samples and claimed that his product was no 
longer marketable or fit for consumption and was subjected to a 
―material interference‖ under German law.73  Monsanto argued 
that Regulation No. 1829/2003 was not applicable to GMOs found 
in honey and, furthermore, honey could no longer contain a 
―GMO‖ because the pollen in the honey no longer possessed any 
capacity to reproduce.74  The European Court of Justice agreed that 
the pollen was no longer a ―genetically modified food‖ because it 
had lost its ability to transfer genetic material, but disagreed that 
Regulation 1829/2003 did not apply.75  Because the honey was 
―food produced from or containing ingredients produced from 
GMOs,‖ it was subject to the EU‘s labeling laws.76  Finding 
 
70 Case C-442/09, Bablok v. Freistaat Bayern, 2011 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 
62009CJ0442, ¶ 109 (Sept. 6, 2011), available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu 
/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=celex:62009CJ0442:en:html (ruling that genet-
ically modified food and feed must be interpreted as a substance which has lost its 
ability to reproduce) (internal quotation marks omitted); Commission Regulation 
1829/2003, supra note 26, art. 3(1)(c). 
71 Case C-442/09 ¶29 (2011) (discussing the cultivation of MON 810 maize 
prohibited in Germany). 
72 Id. ¶¶ 30, 32. 
73 See id. ¶¶ 37, 39 (referring to MON 810 maize pollen as being no longer 
marketable or fit for consumption). 
74 See id. ¶¶ 43, 44 (arguing that Regulation No. 1829/2003 is not applicable 
to MON 810 maize pollen found in honey because it does not have the capability 
to reproduce). 
75 Id. ¶¶ 108, 109. 
76 Id. ¶ 109.  The Court noted that the GMO pollen was an ―ingredient‖ of the 
contaminated honey.  Id. ¶ 79. 
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otherwise would allow ―a foodstuff such as honey [to] . . . escape 
any safety checks, even though it might contain significant 
quantities of genetically modified material.‖77 
Contamination costs have a tangible, important impact on EU 
farmers and producers in both the creation and marketing of 
goods.  Bablok v. Bayern indicates that the European Courts will 
literally interpret GMO restrictions and strictly apply labeling laws 
such as Regulation No. 1829/2003, in which any foodstuffs 
containing more than 0.9% of GMO products must be labeled as 
containing GMOs.78  While the 0.9% level allows a low threshold 
for adventitious presence and other unintended contamination of 
traditionally grown crops, it in effect requires the segregation of 
GMOs in all stages of production, handling, storage, shipment, 
processing, and marketing.79  If GMOs contaminate crops that are 
marketed as organic or traditionally grown, those farmers will 
have to label their products as containing GMOs.  Although those 
farmers may have invested heavily in keeping their crops organic 
or traditional, they will lose any economic benefit of being able to 
advertise as ―GMO-free.‖ 
3.2. Centralization Can Reduce Spillover Effects 
The EU‘s decentralized proposal places a significant burden on 
farmers in countries that prohibit the cultivation of GMOs.  
Presumably, nations that decide to ban GMOs put a high 
preference on traditionally grown crops; consumers in these 
countries, in turn, would most likely not purchase or would 
undervalue any crops contaminated by GMOs from a neighboring 
nation.  The contaminated goods can no longer freely move in the 
market, and are no longer considered equal to their non-
contaminated counterparts. 
Under a centralized system, the EU could limit or internalize 
the costs of spillover by uniformly prohibiting or allowing the 
 
77 See id. ¶ 82 (discussing how the proposed interpretation would not be suc-
cessful because foods such as honey escape safety checks for significant amounts 
of genetically modified material). 
78 Council Regulation 1829/2003, supra note 26, at 11 (regulating the labeling 
of GMO food and feed). 
79 See Strauss, supra note 1, at 813 (noting further that many American manu-
facturers have not marketed their products in the EU because this process is not 
mandated in the United States). 
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cultivation of a GMO.  The EU as a central body can better take 
into account the trans-boundary nature of GMO regulation.  If 
Bablok v. Bayern occurred in a centralized system, for example, 
Bablok would not be unfairly burdened by his proximity to a 
research field.  While a centralized system could not stop the 
contamination of his honey, all honey producers in Europe would 
theoretically be exposed to the same risk (or not exposed, 
depending on whether the MON 810 would be uniformly banned).  
The benefits and costs of GMOs would not be limited to borders of 
―GMO‖ and ―non-GMO‖ countries, but would either be reduced 
by a ban or spread out by an approval. 
3.3. Centralization and Lower Transaction Costs 
In addition to the physical concern of contamination, the EU 
must also address ideological objections.  A recent poll conducted 
on behalf of the European Commission indicates seventy percent 
of Europeans agree that GM foods are ―fundamentally unnatural,‖ 
while only twenty-three percent believe that the development of 
GMOs should be encouraged.80  Before the decentralization 
proposal, six nations—Austria, Hungary, France, Greece, 
Germany, and Luxembourg—had already banned the cultivation 
of Monsanto‘s GM maize, while Austria, Luxembourg, and 
Hungary objected to the cultivation of the Amflora potato.81 
The ideological impact of GMOs is clearly illustrated in 
Hungary, for example.  In July 2011, the Ministry of Rural 
Development outlawed the cultivation and sale of GMO 
contaminated seeds.82  Contaminated crops and crops in a buffer 
 
80 European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 341: Biotechnology, at 18 (Oct. 
2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives 
/ebs/ebs_341_en.pdf (presenting survey data on European attitudes towards ge-
netically modified foods). 
81 See Robert Wielaard, EU: Leave GMO Food Decisions for Governments , 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 13, 2010, 11:38 AM), available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9GU8H0G1.htm (noting 
sentiments among anti-GMO advocacy groups that the EU decision to allow states 
to determine whether to permit GM crops exposes EU nationals to food and feed 
contamination risks). 
82 See The Ministry of Rural Development’s New GMO Statute in Effect, WEBSITE 
OF THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT (July 15, 2011, 5:51 PM), 
http://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-rural-development/news/the-
ministry-of-rural-development-s-new-gmo-statute-in-effect (―In the case of seeds 
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area surrounding the vicinity must be quarantined and destroyed 
either by the crop producer or the Hungarian Central Agricultural 
Office.83  On July 15, 2011, the day the law was put into effect, 940 
hectares of GMO contaminated crops were destroyed and 2,500 
hectares were slated to be deep ploughed.84  According to the State 
Secretary, ―keeping the country free of GMOs is an issue of 
national strategy and security.  Pure, GMO-free seed cultivation 
and agriculture is a significant market advantage for Hungary.‖85 
Importers and cultivators must balance anti-GMO legislation, 
such as that in Hungary, against pro-GMO legislation in other 
European nations, such as Romania.86  Romania shares an 
extensive border with Hungary but has a very different approach 
to biotechnology.  Before joining the EU in 2007, Romania was a 
significant producer of GMOs.87  Although Romania has since 
banned the cultivation of all GMOs except for MON 810 maize, 
Romania‘s Agriculture Minister Valeriu Tabara is adamant about 
cultivating more GMOs in the future.88  Minister Tabara has 
requested the European Commission to reauthorize the cultivation 
of GMOs in Romania, noting ―the agricultural potential of 
Romania in assuring vegetable protein, food and feed fell 
dramatically in 2007, once adhering to the EU, by banning GM 
soy.‖89  ―Romania is losing around 1 billion euro per year,‖ 
 
produced in Hungary the producer is responsible for keeping seeds GMO free, 
while in other cases the primary importer may be held accountable.‖). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 We Don’t Need Genetically Manipulated Organisms , WEBSITE OF THE 
HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT (Sept. 30, 2011, 7:16 PM), http://www.kormany.hu 
/en/ministry-of-rural-development/news/we-don-t-need-genetically-
manipulated-organisms. 
86 Spain is also a fervent supporter of GMOs.  As of 2009 it cultivated nearly 
seventy-five percent of all GMOs in the EU. See, Andrew Willis, Spain a Key Ally of 
Pro-GMO America, Cables Reveal, EUOBSERVER.COM (Dec. 20, 2010, 9:51 AM), 
http://euobserver.com/9/31544. 
87 See Marian Chiriac, Romania to Push for Approval of GMO Soybeans, 
BALKANINSIGHT (Apr. 12, 2011, 8:53 AM), http://www.balkaninsight.com 
/en/article/romania-plans-to-grow-gm-soybeans. 
88 See id. (statement of Valeriu Tabara) (―[W]e have to make every effort this 
year in order to reach agreement within the European Union for cultivating and 
exporting genetically modified soybeans.‖). 
89 Romanian Agriculture Minister Puts His Money Where His Mouth Is, INFOMG 
(Feb. 05, 2011), http://www.infomg.ro/web/en/Home/News/3/1287. 
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Minister Tabara argued, ―because it does not cultivate genetically 
modified soybeans.‖90  
The imbalance between Hungary‘s and Romania‘s positions on 
GMOs, in turn, significantly affects potential transaction costs.91  In 
addition to spillover effects from cross-border contamination,92 
importers and enforcement agencies will incur costs to ensure 
GMO-goods coming from and going to pro-GMO Romania do not 
contaminate anti-GMO Hungarian cultivation.  If the Member 
States‘ only concern was between GMOs and uncontaminated, 
traditionally grown products, each Member State could negotiate 
their rights between neighbors and obtain a system that preserves 
what they value most.93  When dealing with a good as prolific and 
fundamental as foodstuff, however, decentralization presents 
exceedingly high costs in trading, inspecting, regulating, and 
informing for producers, consumers, corporations, and 
governments.  As demonstrated in Eastern Europe (with the 
exception of Romania where laws may be less severe),94 where 
producers and importers are held strictly responsible for keeping 
GMOs out of Hungarian fields, neighboring Member States and 
international importers alike may accrue high costs in keeping 
Hungary‘s soil GMO-free.  Additionally, importers must consider 
costs of importing GMO seeds and planting instruments to 
countries where, in effect, it is illegal to use them.  While the 2011 
Amended Proposal only regards the cultivation of GMOs and not 
the sale of GMOs, the actual effect on companies producing a good 
that would be unusable in certain Member States cannot be 
overlooked. 
 
90 Chiriac, supra note 87.  
91 See Louis Antoine, Ciolos Voices Misgivings About GMOs, EUROPOLITICS 
(May 9, 2011), http://www.europolitics.info/ciolos-voices-misgivings-about-
gmos-art303301.html. 
92 See supra Section 3.1 (noting that GMOs can spread their altered genetic 
material through cross-pollination and contaminate non-GMO crops and prod-
ucts). 
93 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) 
(arguing that in a world without transaction costs, parties could rearrange rights 
to achieve the optimum value of production). 
94 See The Ministry of Rural Development’s New GMO Statute in Effect, supra 
note 82 (―The Government decided . . . to act as forcefully as possible against 
companies selling seeds contaminated with genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs), and therefore requested the amendment of the Penal Code and the rele-
vant legislation in order to ensure severe punishment and a strong deterrent.‖). 
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As a comparison, a decentralized GMO regime between 
Member States would be much like the emission standards of 
California and the United States.  Except for a few exemptions, 
California laws forbid the use, sale, purchase, lease, rental, and 
distribution of any new motor vehicle that has not been certified by 
the state.95  By allowing two different emission standards,96 
manufacturers either have to build ―California standard cars‖ and 
―federal standard cars,‖ or simply build cars for the more stringent 
California standards (thus making separate federal standards 
moot).  Consumers, similarly, have to conduct more research to 
ensure that they do not purchase a car that cannot be driven in 
their home state, or, alternatively, do not spend additional funds 
on a car that was built for standards that do not apply to them. 97  
Motor vehicle importers and exporters need to monitor what 
products may be sold in each state, while inspectors need to have 
more control over imports and exports to ensure that they comply 
with state standards. 
Although stricter emission standards provided an overall 
benefit for public health and the environment, the transaction costs 
of the fragmented system raised a real concern.98  After the federal 
government enacted a law that will again centralize emission 
standards under a federal rule, automakers ―welcomed a national 
plan that does not require them to build different vehicles for 
 
95 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 43150–43156 (West 2012). 
96 See Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY 
SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/vehicle 
_ghg_standard.cfm (last updated Oct. 31, 2011) (noting the difference between 
California and federal emissions standards and how the EPA and California have 
cooperated to enforce their respective standards).  
97 See, e.g., CAL. DEP‘T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, FAST FACT BROCHURE FFVR 29, 
BEFORE BUYING A VEHICLE FROM OUT OF STATE—BE SURE YOU CAN REGISTER IT IN 
CALIFORNIA (2010), available at  http://dmv.ca.gov/pubs/brochures 
/fast_facts/ffvr29.htm (advising California residents to ensure any new vehicle 
purchase is certified to meet California‘s smog law requirements). 
98 See Ken Bensinger, California Emission Waiver Looms for Carmakers, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/19/business/fi-
fueleconomy19 (stating that California‘s emission standards pose ―a nightmare 
scenario for automakers, which argue that complying with the California guide-
lines would create regulatory headaches and a technology burden that could add 
at least $1,000 and as much as $5,000 to the cost of each vehicle‖). 
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different markets to comply with varying state laws.‖99  The Vice 
President of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Gloria 
Bergquist, praised the centralization of emission standards, noting 
―[a] year ago, we were facing piecemeal policies set out by EPA, 
DOT, and groups of different states.  Our auto engineers cannot 
design vehicles to different standards.‖100 
Likewise, under a centralized GMO cultivation standard, 
producers, manufacturers, and corporations will only have to 
comply with one unified standard.101  Importers and exporters will 
not have to limit their resources, reroute supply lines, or change 
the flow of commerce to comply with potentially conflicting 
standards in each Member State.  Finally, while individual 
consumers may still have high costs of consumption based on their 
personal preferences, a centralized GMO cultivation policy may 
better standardize information and make the variety of food 
choices easier to understand. 
In sum, centralized decision-making over the cultivation of 
GMOs is important because of the physical realities of the 
European Union.  While Member States have a key responsibility 
to their citizens as sovereigns, Member States also have a 
responsibility to each other.  Unlike the United States, Member 
States must balance between regulation as distinct sovereigns and 
regulation to ―ensure the economic and social progress of [the] 
States by common action to eliminate the barriers which divide 
Europe.‖102  The spillover cost of contamination and the transaction 
costs in negotiating between pro-GMO and anti-GMO states affect 
the EU in a unique way because the Member States physically 
neighbor each other and economically strive for uniformity.  ―If 
Member States can opt out of a product approval system simply 
 
99 John M. Broder, U.S. Issues Limits on Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Cars, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/02/science 
/earth/02emit.html. 
100 Id. 
101 See Coase, supra note 93, at 16 (―Within the firm individual bargains be-
tween the various cooperating factors of production are eliminated and for a mar-
ket transaction is substituted an administrative decision.  The rearrangement of 
production then takes place without the need for bargains between the owners of 
the factors of production.‖).  In the EU‘s case, bargaining within the European 
Community would reduce the costs of bargaining between individual Member 
States. 
102 TFEU, supra note 40, at pmbl. 
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because of political preference,‖ however, ―the result will be more 
uncertainty and less choice for farmers.‖103  Once GMOs are 
cultivated in one area, there is little a neighboring state can do to 
avoid their effects.  Centralization obligates the neighboring states 
to make the decision together. 
4. THE CASE AGAINST DECENTRALIZED DECISION-MAKING OVER 
GMO CULTIVATION 
The EU‘s proposal to decentralize GMO cultivation will 
encourage Member States to move forward under different 
economic and agricultural policies, dividing the EU‘s common 
marketplace and disincentivizing a cooperative, cohesive approach 
to agriculture.  Additionally, the EU‘s proposal does not address 
the WTO‘s 2006 decision regarding GMO application approval.  As 
such, although decentralized regulation may address concerns that 
centralization cannot, it is ultimately not an appropriate response 
to the particular issues raised by GMO cultivation in the EU. 
 
4.1. The EU’s Proposal May Not Actually Allow Member States to 
Decide Whether to Cultivate GMOs 
In September 2011, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
ruled on Monsanto SAS‘s and other GMO companies‘ complaint 
regarding a French law that suspended the transfer, use, and 
planting of MON 810 maize seed varieties.104  The Court held that 
Member States may not prohibit or suspend the sale of GMO seeds 
authorized for cultivation under Directive 90/220 and existing 
 
103 EU Lawmakers Give Backing for National GM Crop Bans, REUTERS, Jul. 5, 
2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/05/us-eu-gmo-
cultivation-idUSTRE7644UD20110705 (quoting Carel du Marchie Sarvaas of Eu-
ropaBio, an EU biotech industry association). 
104 See Joined Cases C-58/10 to C-68/10, Monsanto SAS v. Ministre de l'Agri-
culture et de la Pêche, EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62010CJ0058,  ¶ 2 (Sept. 8, 2011), 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri 
=CELEX:62010CJ0058:EN:HTML (establishing the issues of the case).  The French 
law was Article L.535-2 of the French Code de l‘environnement, which allowed 
the government to suspend or withdraw a GMO‘s authorization, impose modifi-
cations, or order the destruction if a ―new evaluation of the risks to public health 
or the environment caused by the presence of [GMOs] so justifies.‖  Id. ¶ 24 (quot-
ing Article L.535-2 of the French Code de l‘Environnement, which is in force until 
June 27, 2008). 
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products under Regulation Number 1829/2003.105  Member States 
could only prohibit the sale of authorized GMO seeds under 
―emergency measures‖ after demonstrating the ―existence of a 
situation which is likely to constitute a clear and serious risk to 
human health, animal health or the environment.‖106  Once the EU 
approves a GMO material, in other words, a Member State cannot 
block the GMO without providing new and dependable 
information that the GMO is harmful.107  As one commenter noted, 
―In principle, this judgement [sic] should therefore make it more 
difficult for Member States to unilaterally block approvals that 
have been granted at the EU level.‖108  While the full effect of this 
decision on the EU‘s proposal and a Member State‘s ability to ban 
the cultivation of a not-yet-approved GMO is still unknown, a 
Member State‘s actual ability to independently regulate the 
movement of an approved GMO continues to be limited.109  
Although the proposal may allow Member States to initially decide 
whether or not to cultivate GMOs, the full legal impact of other 
GMO regulations may ultimately obstruct their decision. 
The proposal to decentralize the decision to cultivate GMOs, 
furthermore, may be ineffective because it does not address the 
 
105 Id. ¶ 63.  Directive 90/220 provides for the European Community‘s au-
thorization of GMOs that will be intentionally released into the environment, such 
as occurs during cultivation.  Id. ¶ 5.  Regulation Number 1829/2003 provides for 
authorization of GMO products to be used as source material for the production 
of feed.  Id. ¶ 11. 
106 Id. ¶ 81. 
107 See Press Release, Sidley Austin LLP, Court of Justice Affirms Primacy of 
EU in Suspending GMO Approvals (Sept. 27, 2011), available at 
http://m.sidley.com/court-of-justice-affirms-primacy-of-eu-in-suspending-gmo-
approvals-09-27-2011/ (summarizing the Court of Justice‘s decision and its inter-
pretation of emergency measures as referring to ―significant risk which clearly jeop-
ardizes human health, animal health or the environment‖) (emphasis in original). 
108 Id. 
109 See Council Directive 2002/53, art. 16, 2002 O.J. (L 193) 6, 7 (EC) (forbid-
ding Member States from placing marketing restrictions on a variety of approved 
agricultural plant species except GMOs, for which limitations are allowed only if 
the variety could be ―harmful . . . [to] plant health,‖ does not correspond to the 
original approved species, or if there is another valid reason based on ―a risk for 
human health or the environment‖); see also Press Release, EUROPA, GM Feed Ban: 
Commission Takes Poland to the EU Court of Justice (March 14, 2011), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/292 (announc-
ing the EU‘s decision to bring Poland to the Court of Justice for passing a law that 
will prohibit the production and marketing of GMO animal feed in violation of 
Regulation No. 1829/2003). 
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WTO‘s 2006 decision or comply with the SPS Agreement.110  The 
July 5, 2011 amendments enumerated several reasons Member 
States may exclude GMOs, including ―other grounds that may 
include land use, town and country planning, or other legitimate 
factors.‖111  The SPS Agreement, however, dictates that ―Members 
shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied 
only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life 
or health, is based on scientific principles and is not maintained without 
sufficient scientific evidence . . . .‖112  To comply with the SPS 
Agreement, any basis for excluding GMO cultivation must still be 
based on sufficient scientific principles, regardless of the EU‘s 
enumerated reasons.113 
U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk recognized the 
shortcomings of the EU proposal well before the non-scientific 
reasons were listed in the amendment.114  Kirk notes:  ―[w]hat we 
want in every case is an open, transparent process that conforms 
with international, scientific standards, and you‘re not going to be 
able to do that if you have member states all coming up with their 
 
110 See supra Section 2.1 (discussing the WTO panel report and the SPS 
agreement). 
111 2011 Amended Proposal, supra note 39, amend. 16.  See supra notes 39–46 
and accompanying text (providing a detailed discussion of the amendments to the 
2001 Directive); see also Brussels Supports Decentralised GM Crop Proposal, INT‘L CTR. 
FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (July 11, 2011), http://ictsd.org 
/i/news/biores/110309/ (observing that ―[c]ritics fear that the legislation will 
lead to fragmentation of internal EU policies, uncertainty for farmers and incom-
patibility with WTO law‖). 
112 SPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 2(2) (emphasis added).  The SPS Agree-
ment further notes:  
In assessing the risk to animal or plant life or health . . . Members shall 
take into account as relevant economic factors: the potential damage in 
terms of loss of production or sales in the event of the entry, establish-
ment or spread of a pest or disease; the costs of control or eradication in 
the territory of the importing Member; and the relative cost-effectiveness 
of alternative approaches to limiting risks.   
Id. art. 5(3). 
113 This is assuming that Member States will be held to the SPS Agreement by 
other signatories, such as the United States, Argentina, and Canada, regardless of 
whether the country provides non-sanitary reasons for banning GMOs. 
114 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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own rules.‖115  Member States have also raised concerns regarding 
the proposal.  The Italian Agricultural Minister Giancarlo Galan 
said that ―Italy opposes the ‗each on his own‘ logic that involves 
fragmenting Europe‘s common agricultural policies . . . [t]he GMO 
theme is too important to be left up to the decisions of individual 
countries.‖116  France‘s Minister of Food, Agriculture and Fishing, 
Bruno Lemaire, has agreed:  ―[d]ecisions taken at a national level 
are not reassuring either for [EU] citizens or for Europe.‖117  France 
has furthermore ―expressed the worry that the proposal could 
leave‖ Member States vulnerable to WTO challenges,118 and the 
European Council‘s internal legal service has noted that ―the 
proposal may violate the national treatment principle in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade . . . .‖119 
Representative Kirk and the Member States‘ concern may be 
well founded.  A shadow draftsman of the 2011 amendment, Bart 
Staes (Belgium), has stated:  ―clearly an EU-wide moratorium 
would give the greatest certainty to the member states and clear 
majority of citizens that are opposed to GMO cultivation.  
However, this vote would give greater legal certainty to countries 
or regions wishing to introduce bans and, as such, is a step 
forward.‖120  It is difficult to imagine that the WTO‘s decision—that 
the EU‘s de facto moratorium on GMOs was an ―across-the-board 
marketing ban‖ and violated the SPS Agreement121—can be 
remedied with a proposal that makes it easier for Member States to 
introduce bans. 
Lastly, the EU‘s proposal has yet to address the WTO‘s 
mandate to the EU to process GMO applications ―without undue 
 
115 USTR Kirk Flags Problem with EU GMO Cultivation Policy on New Bans , 16 
INSIDE WASHINGTON‘S FDA WEEK (Inside Health Policy, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 6, 
2010, at 12. 
116 Italian Agriculture Minister Argues Decisions on GMOs Must be EU-Wide, 
BBC MONITORING EUROPE, Sept. 28, 2010. 
117 Id. 
118 Commission ‘Opt-Out’ Proposal on GMO Cultivation Largely Deadlocked, 29 
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 7, 2011. 
119 Id. 
120 European Parliament Paves Way for GMO Crop Bans, ACTMEDIA (Dec. 7, 
2011), http://www.actmedia.eu/2011/07/12/top+story/european+parliament 
+paves+way+for+gmo+crop+bans/34643. 
121 Panel Report, supra note 2, at 41. 
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delay.‖122  While the EU‘s legislative process is certainly a 
necessary ―delay,‖ the proposal is just that—a proposal—five years 
after the WTO‘s decision.  As EuropaBio complained in October 
2011 to EU policymakers:  ―[t]he EU authorization process for GM 
products takes substantially longer than comparable systems, 
despite the fact that government processes around the world to 
assess the safety and impact of GM products are essentially the 
same . . . .‖123  Since 2007, the number of GM crops awaiting 
approval has risen from around fifty to seventy-two, including 
twenty-one applications for cultivation, and is expected to be over 
ninety pending approvals by 2015.124 
4.2. Decentralization May Run Counter to the Common Market 
At its core, decentralization of GMO cultivation ―runs counter 
to the principle of a unified EU market‖125 and EU competition 
principles.  The Common Market demands ―concerted action in 
order to guarantee steady expansion, balanced trade, and fair 
competition.‖126  The debates surrounding GMOs and GMO 
labeling laws, however, indicate that certain Member States and 
markets will be inherently discriminatory towards GMO and non-
GMO products.127  GMOs do provide certain benefits that make 
them cheaper to grow and more affordable to buy.  For example, 
 
122 See Council Conclusions on Genetically Modified Organisms, supra note 
34, at 2 (stating that improvement of the implementation of the legal framework in 
order to better meet the objectives of the EC legislation necessitates continuing 
processing applications without undue delays). 
123 Charlie Dunmore, Biotech Firms Warn EU Over Pace of GM Crop Approvals, 
REUTERS, Oct. 11, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011 
/10/11/us-eu-gmo-approvals-idUSTRE79A3G520111011; see also Damien Gera-
din, The European Community: Environmental Issues in an Integrated Market, in THE 
GREENING OF TRADE LAW: INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATIONS AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 117, 129 (Richard H. Steinberg ed., 2002) (―Inconsistent 
member state product standards may fragment the market, increase transaction 
costs, and generate diseconomies of scale for all producers.‖). 
124 Dunmore, supra note 123. 
125 Commission ‘Opt-Out’ Proposal on GMO Cultivation Largely Deadlocked, supra 
note 118 (noting Germany and Spain‘s opposition to the European Commission‘s 
opt-out proposal on GMO cultivation). 
126 TFEU, supra note 40, pmbl. 
127 For an example of this debate as highlighted by differing laws between 
two neighboring countries, see discussion supra Section 3.3 (contrasting Hunga-
ry‘s firm anti-GMO legislation with Romania‘s pro-GMO legislation). 
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GMO cultivation can increase crop production and productivity,128 
and some GMO varieties can thrive under adverse conditions.129  
Moreover, many GMOs are bred pesticide-ready or pesticide-
resistant,130 and can be engineered to have lower fungal toxins or 
an increased shelf life.131  Because GMO producers have more 
control over pests and yield numbers, their products can be 
cheaper than their non-GMO counterparts. 
As such, imported GMO products will most likely be less 
expensive than their traditionally grown local counterparts in 
countries that ban GMO cultivation.  Importing cheaper GMO 
foods (which Member States must allow)132 inherently undercuts 
domestic products and unfairly competes with local agriculture, 
which would be legally barred from growing the less expensive 
GMO.  As GMO domestic markets develop, the products of 
countries that do not cultivate GMOs will be more expensive than 
their imported counterparts from pro-GMO countries. 
This expected price discrepancy may lead to competition issues 
between Member States in violation of several principles laid out in 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  Notably, 
any ―restriction or distortion of competition within the internal 
market‖ is prohibited by Article 101.133  Although Article 101 is 
 
128 Panel Report, supra note 2, at 28–29 (quoting FAO Statement on Biotechnolo-
gy, U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/biotech/fao-statement-on-
biotechnology/en). 
129 See Katharine A. Van Tassel, Genetically Modified Plants Used for Food, Risk 
Assessment and Uncertainty Principles: Does the Transition from Ignorance to Indeter-
minacy Trigger the Need for Post-Market Surveillance?, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 220, 
226 (2009) (noting that a GM tomato plant has been engineered to grow in high 
salinity soil in which ordinary plants would not otherwise grow). 
130 See, e.g., id. at 232–33 (discussing GM peas that were engineered to contain 
a green bean protein which ―inhibits weevils from digesting starch which causes 
the weevils to starve to death‖). 
131 See Valery Federici, Genetically Modified Food and Informed Consumer Choice: 
Comparing U.S. and E.U. Labeling Laws, 35 BROOK. J. INT‘L L. 515, 523–24 (2010) (not-
ing that certain genetic modifications ―have produced many important benefits, 
including lower average levels of fungal toxins on produce [and] increased shelf 
life‖). 
132 See supra note 6 and accompanying text (noting that the adopted EU Pro-
posal of 2010 regarding GMO foods prohibits Member States from interrupting 
the free flow of GMOs). 
133 TFEU, supra note 40, art. 101(1).  See also id. pmbl (recognizing a desire to 
promote fair competition throughout the Common Market). 
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traditionally read to concern companies and undertakings,134 the 
treaty prohibits all ―concerted practices which may affect trade 
between Member States . . . which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition.‖135  A Member 
State‘s decision to cultivate GMOs would inherently distort 
competition of its domestic goods and domestic companies.  While 
all regulations affect competition on some level, decentralized 
decision-making over GMO cultivation would acutely harm 
competition in the Common Market.  Member States that do not 
allow GMO cultivation would be forced to accept dissimilar 
conditions between locally grown traditional crops and imported 
GMOs, which will put local agriculture perpetually at a 
competitive disadvantage.136 
The potential risks posed by GMOs further exacerbate this 
competitive disadvantage.  While it is beyond the scope of this 
Comment to explore the scientific theories or the full economic 
advantages or disadvantages of GMOs, conducting a cost-benefit 
analysis pertaining to use of GMOs is an important consideration 
when evaluating competitive advantages.  Countries that allow 
GMO cultivation are not only gaining potential advantages,137 but 
are also exposing themselves and their neighbors to potential risks 
of cross-contamination.138  Decentralization of cultivation allows a 
country that chooses to cultivate GMOs to reap the benefits while 
exposing neighboring nations to the costs.  Such costs, for example, 
include reported incidents in which pesticide and herbicide-ready 
GMOs have actually increased the need for stronger chemicals as 
pests and weeds become resistant or are contaminated with GMO 
 
134 See, e.g., Application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (Formerly Articles 81 and 82 
of the EC Treaty), EUROPA, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/competition 
/firms/l26092_en.htm (last updated Mar. 14, 2011) (summarizing ―the new ar-
rangements for applying the antitrust procedures . . . introduced by Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 . . . in the interests of consumers and businesses, 
while easing the administrative burden of firms doing business in Europe‖). 
135 TFEU, supra note 40, art. 101(1) (emphasis added). 
136 Article 101 expressly prohibits application of ―dissimilar conditions to 
equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a com-
petitive disadvantage.‖  TFEU, supra note 40, art. 101(1)(d). 
137 See supra notes 119–22 and accompanying text (describing proposed mora-
toria on GMO cultivation in order to limit potential gains by countries that allow 
GMO cultivation). 
138 See discussion supra Section 3.1 (discussing spillover effects of GMO 
transboundary contamination). 
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genes.139  Resistant weeds and pests not only affect farmers using 
biotechnology, but also jeopardize the natural insecticides used by 
organic farmers.140  Other risks include allergic or toxic reactions to 
GM foods,141 reactions of cross-breeding high allergen foods with 
low allergen foods,142 and antibiotic resistance in people and 
animals caused by widespread consumption of GMOs containing 
antibiotic marker genes,143 all of which could be incorporated into 
the genes of traditionally grown crops via cross-pollination.  
Finally, cross-pollination contamination between GMOs and non-
target organisms, such as wild plants or neighboring crops, could 
drastically reduce biodiversity.144  The eradication of target and 
non-target pest populations may harm the ecosystem in unknown 
ways,145 and some studies have suggested that GMOs may have a 
 
139 See First Documented Case of Pest Resistance to Biotech Cotton , SCI. DAILY, 
(Feb. 7, 2008), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/02 
/080207140803.htm (reporting that bollworms, a major cotton pest, were discov-
ered in Missouri and Arkansas to have evolved resistance to Bt, a toxin engi-
neered in certain GM crops to kill insects); see also William Neuman & Andrew 
Pollack, Farmers Cope with Roundup-Resistant Weeds, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/business/energy-environment 
/04weed.html?%ED%AF%80%ED%B2%AB (describing the proliferation of ten 
species of pesticide-resistant weeds over twenty-two states and the need to spray 
pesticide-ready fields with more toxic chemicals). 
140 See Van Tassel, supra note 129, at 226–27 (listing various risks that are 
posed to ecosystems by the use of GM plants). 
141 See, e.g., GM Peas Cause Immune Response—A Gap in the Approval Process?, 
GMO COMPASS (Jan. 3, 2006), http://www.gmo-compass.org/eng/news/stories 
/175.gm_peas_australia_cause_immune_response.html (noting that an Australian 
private research facility discovered that a protein in GM peas produced an allergic 
reaction in mice, which could potentially produce an allergic reaction in humans).  
Notably, there are no reports proving the existence of these types of reactions in 
humans. 
142 See, e.g., Federici, supra note 131, at 540 (highlighting voluntary labeling 
statements and indicating that cross-breeding a food a consumer is not allergic to, 
such as a tomato, with a food the consumer is allergic to, such as a Brazil nut, may 
produce a GM tomato to which the consumer is allergic). 
143 See Panel Report, supra note 2, at 32 (noting that the European Communi-
ties food safety concerns about GMOs affected the EC‘s approval regime). 
144 See id. at 66 (―Potential harmful effects on the environment . . . include 
non-target effects, invasiveness and development of resistance, unintended effects 
arising through GMO related management practices, and effects on biodiversity.‖)  
145 See Lee Stockhorst, Note, Super Crops or a Super Problem? The Battle Over Bt 
Corn, 15 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y REV. 531, 545 (2008) (―While Bt products are creat-
ed to target specific crop-destroying insects, there is nothing to say that other, 
non-target insects, will not ingest the Bt toxin.  This process could threaten the 
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reduced or negative nutritional impact.146  In short, the decision to 
cultivate GMOs is not an easy one, and allowing Member States to 
independently decide whether or not to cultivate GMOs creates 
two separate markets with distinct cost-benefit frameworks. 
If the EU‘s proposal does prove to be an effective vehicle by 
which Member States can decide whether or not to cultivate GMOs 
on their soil, the Common Market will split between GMO goods 
and non-GMO goods, creating unfair competition between 
imported GMO and local non-GMO goods in countries that choose 
to ban cultivation.  Given the potential advantages and 
disadvantages that GMOs present Member States, coupled with 
the spillover effect of cross-pollination, only a centralized decision-
making body can fully weigh EU-wide costs and benefits of 
cultivating GMOs and protect the free movement of European 
foodstuffs. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Although a decentralized system of government may more 
simply address GMOs and the scientific uncertainty surrounding 
their long-term effects, a centralized approval system would best 
address the unique concerns of the EU while still complying with 
the WTO‘s 2006 decision.  Centralization reduces the risk of one 
country being harmed by another county‘s decision whether to 
cultivate GMOs.  If Member States are acting together, the costs 
associated with the spillover effect of cross-pollination could be 
uniformly allowed or discouraged, depending on the EU-wide 
policy on that GMO.  A consistent position on cultivating a GMO, 
furthermore, will decrease transaction costs by reducing the 
potentially incalculable information, inspection, and import and 
export costs, as well as discourage discrimination between GMO 
and non-GMO crops.  By continuing a unified GMO policy, the EU 
as a whole will be better armed to confront pressures from the 
international community and address issues of contamination. 
 
survival of hundreds of insect species, not to mention the potential unbalance in 
the ecosystem that could result from an insect species being eradicated in a par-
ticular area.‖). 
146 See Strauss, supra note 1, at 779 (discussing the potential risks of GMOs 
and the substantial scientific uncertainty surrounding biotechnology). 
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It is important to note that the WTO decision only determined 
that the EU was not in compliance with one article and one annex 
of the SPS Agreement and did not make substantive findings 
regarding GMOs.147  By establishing clear, non-arbitrary standards 
based on the precautionary principle148 in order to approve or 
disapprove GMOs without undue delay, the EU may satisfy the 
WTO while also responding to the issues surrounding GMOs. 
A Communitywide approval system may find that, contrary to 
European public opinion, GMOs are acceptable and should be 
approved for cultivation in all or parts of the EU despite the risks.  
A unified front on GMOs, however, will best preserve the structure 
of the EU and the Common Market, and will allow for more 
comprehensive regulation of GMO trade and cultivation.  By 
identifying and remedying possible issues surrounding GMOs, the 
EU can present a united front against outside pressures and better 
regulate and protect at home.  
 
 
147 See generally Panel Report, supra note 2, at 1067–69 (concluding that while 
the Panel did not examine the safety of biotech products, it did examine whether 
European Communities acted inconsistently as to the requirements of the SPS 
Agreement). 
148 See TFEU, supra note 40, art. 191(2) (―Union policy on the environment 
shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of situa-
tions in the various regions of the Union.  It shall be based on the precautionary 
principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that envi-
ronmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter  
should pay.‖). 
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